Tuesday, 25 November 2008

Contingency/6 - Chatton

Dear Everyone,
As announced on the mailing list, I'm going to delay a little bit the edition of John of Ripa, in order to complete properly the exposition about contingency and free will among the masters of Oxford.
Today we're dealing in particular with Walter Chatton and we will see:
- Introduction to his philosophical positions
- Exposition of his thought about future contingency
- Full text: Chatton's Reportatio in Primum Sententiarum, dist. 38

Although his career is not outstanding and suffered many up and down, Walter Chatton is certainly one of the most interesting figures who participated to the theological and philosophical debates in Oxford in years 1320 - 1340. Besides some disputed questions and a Quodlibet, the most important part of his teaching activity in London and Oxford is the Commentary on the Four Books of Sentences, which is surviving both in a Lectura and in a Reportatio. The Reportatio on the First book of Sentences is quite remarkable for length and quality of argumentation and proofs that our author was very well acquainted with the positions of many previous and contemporary schools and authors, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, Richard Campsall (the "anglicus", whose theological treatises seem unfortunately lost), Peter Auriol and Adam Wodeham. It's almost known for sure that he had a personal debate with William of Ockham, the most mentioned and accurately discussed author in the Lectura; from these disputations comes the appellative of "anti - Ockhamist" often given to Chatton.

What does the Chatton's anti - Ockhamism consist in?
Ockham’s principle of economy, the well known “razor” of the vulgata, says that every extra mental distinction among extra mental things must be denied unless it can be proved by self evident premises, by direct experience or by the authority of the Bible, the Saints or the doctors.
Chatton’s counter argument claims that the application of this principle can lead to wrong consequences, in particular when the demonstration of a proposition needs elements each one of those needs in turn more elements. Although Chatton has proposed more formulations of this principle, the basic statement can be found in the 3rd distinction of his Lectura, where he states that when a proposition can be verified for actually existing things, if two things cannot suffice for the verification of the proposition since another thing is required, the this other thing must be given and so on.
As Keele pointed out, the principle in itself appears to be trivial, since it seems that in this way we could at anytime call for as many things as we need; but if we carefully follow Chatton’s text we see that his principle has a more complex structure and can be developed in two stages.
In the first stage, we can ask how many things are required to certify a given proposition known to be true; since the proposition is true, we know that such things must exist. According to this first part, things make proposition true and true propositions guarantee in turn the existence of things and their essential determination. Since this first stage involves nothing more than a principle of sufficiency, because it only asks the existence of a sufficient set of things required to certify a proposition known to be true, a second part is required, as Chatton himself declares. This second parts says that we have to consider non sufficient to guarantee the truth of a proposition those propositions with which it is consistent that the proposition is false. Here Chatton gives us a test for when a certain number of entities is insufficient to make a true sentence true. His test is phrased in terms of the consistency of the falsehood of the proposition and the existence of certain things without another. We can reconstruct Chatton’s position in this way:
- we must figure out whether the causal power belonged to some things is enough to make the proposition true
- if they do not suffice, we must figure out how many and what things we must add to see whether, by adding them one by one, the proposition is becoming true. As long as the proposition is false, we must keep adding more things.
The most important point is that, as long as the position is false and we must consequently add more things until the proposition known to be true is fully certified, those things which have to be added are certainly existing. Since Chatton agrees with the “principle of the contradictories” according to which anything existing which is able to turn a proposition from one side to another of a contradiction must be something real, it is therefore clear that the kind of that certainly exist and have to be added to certify the proposition must be not simply reasons but real substances.

Chatton and future contingency
Any inquiry about future contingecy always involves free will and determininsm. When dealing with free will, theologians are concerned both about free will in god and in man, about how the necessity of god can coexist with his free will and with his possibility to think about contingents and finally about how things and events, naturally contingent, can be created and derive by god, whose essence is necessary. Although more than often these questions have been resolved in paradoxical or inconceavable solutions, it is doubtless that the attempt to solve them has led our masters to develop invaluable philosophical concepts and instruments, like those about the nature of time, the composite or divided sense of propositions, the contemporaneity requirements to assent the truth of propositions and so on.
Chatton's solution to the problem of future contingency has been called the "anti - fatalist" argument. It's necessary to declare what a fatalist argument is. A theory about future contingency is called fatalist if it declares that if God know something, then it will be, but since God know that something necessarily, this thing will be necessarily as well.
Chatton refuses the argument at the level of the minor premise, because he points out that if the thing is contingent, the sentence which enounces that God knows it is contingent too. From this notation he developes the following process
1 - To assert a sentence of the form "a will be" really means either to assert that (I) "a will be" is true or that (I) "a is" is true. These two expositions are not equivalent, since one can be true while the other is false.
2 - If a is a contingent thing, then point (I) is right out, since this would entail that there is no reason to take trouble about the future.
3 - Therefore, option (I) holds: if "a" is a contingent thing in "a will be", we must understand the sentence "a will be" to be equivalent to the following contingent sentence ""a is" will be true".
4 - Be "a" a contingent thing. Now, the sentence "God knows that a will be", properly exposited, is equivalent to this conjunction: "God knows a & a will be".
5 - Therefore the following expository equivalences hold: "God knows that a will be" = "God knows a AND a will be" = "God knows a AND "a is" will be true".
6 - "God knows a AND "a is" will be true" has a contingent conjunct, namely the second conjunct.
7 - When a proposition is exposited by a conjunction, if one of the conjuncts of the exposition is contingent, the original proposition is as well.
8 - "God knows that a will be" is contingent.
To sum up, the first part of Chatton's response comes to this:
a - "God knows that a will be" is equivalent to the conjunction "God knows a AND "a is" will be true".
b - The sentence "God knows a" is of course necessary, but ""a is" will be true" is contingent, therefore the conjunction of the two sentences is contingent.
c - Therefore, since "God knows that a will be" is equivalent to a contingent sentence, it is itself contingent.

As we said before, one major concern about about future contingency is its relation to God and in particular about how God can know a contingent thing, if His knowledge is necessary. Moreover, since the definition of necessity was always related to immutability, the second important question in this contest aks how God's knowledge about a thing can come into being and can change during time, to remain true, since the thing itself can change. Lets see how Chatton answers to these problems. Basically, his solution is based on the distinction between knowledge and cognition. According to Chatton, it can still be true that God knows a thing when it is a future contingent object, if these conditions are given:
- The propisition "God knows that a will be" is equivalent to "God knows a and a will be". In this case, "know" is related to cognition.
Chatton explains his idea of divine cognition by recourse to an analogy, a distinction, and a claim about all operations of the divine intellect. His analogy is this: cognition is to knowledge as apprehension is to assent or assertion. The apprehension implies the mere grasp of something without additional judgment about it, and the cognition implies the mere grasp of something, without the additional affirmative judgment implied in the term "knowledge". In this case, the proposition "God knows a" is equal to "God cognizes a", without involving any approval or agreement. This resemble Scotus' argument according to which the divine knowledge of a thing precedes the divine will about that thing. In Chatton's version, God knows a thing when He has cognition of that thing without confirming it. Now, the distinction between knowledge and cognition comes to this point and implies that, since knowledge involves assent, it is necessarily about present existent, whereas cognition does not have this restriction. Therefore God cannot "know" future objects since they are not yet, but he can "cognize" them. Finally (and this claim he intends to apply to both divine "cognition" and divine "knowledge"), God's knowledge and cognition are neither mediated by propositions nor are they generally of propositions. As Scotus did, Chatton holds that God's intellectual activity is not discursive or representative in any way, and that the usual objects of divine intellectual activity are not propositions, but rather real things, that is, res. God does not require any mediator in the operation of his intellect with respect to creation; for example, he requires no concepts or propositions in order to know or to cognize. Rather, God directly cognizes the future contingent things that he cognizes and sees them throughout a direct vision or intuition. As noted above, Chatton was a realist about relations, and since relations are accidents inhering in their subjects, God's cognition of a things includes the cognition of the relational accidents of that thing; therefore, he also cognizes all the situations or states of affairs of this res as well. Since it does not have any intermediation, his cognition is not separated from him. Consequently, divine cognition is, in a sense, not really distinct from God himself.
The answer to the problem about how the necessity of God's knowledge can stay with the contingency of the thing known, comes from what we have seen so far. Although it seems that the necessity of God's knowledge and the determinacy of his concepts could not be otherwise, we must understand that in saying "God knows a thing" we mean "God cognizes a thing" and this "cognition" precedes any kind of judgement, assent, confirmation, approval or voluntarism and it does not infere any real existence or essential determination in the thing mentioned in the proposition. It is clear here how great is the influence of the Subtle Doctor on Chatton, because in the field of cognition, the divine will has no part and consequently the mere cognition does not have any absolute causative power on the thing cognited. Moreover it is coherent with this that the cognition is direct, non discoursive and without any intermediary.
If we look at this important statement from the other side, we conclude that if the thing mentioned in the proposition changes, there is no change in God's cognition about the thing, because cognition is distinct from real effects. This consequence clarifies well how powerful is the distinction between knowledge and cognition claimed by Chatton. Finally the question turns to God's "knowledge", properly speaking. Chatton explains how God's knowledge can change:
- a proposition known by God about the state of a thing comes from being false to true, it the thing really come to that mentioned state. This changes the truth value in God's min
- a proposition known by God about the state of a thing changes according to a real change of that thing.
These cases are not a problem, in Chatton's point of view, because God's knowledge is not generally of propositions, nor is it mediated by them and even when it is of propositions, there is nothing special about how he knows a proposition's shift from truth to falsity, as distinguished from any other form of change; in Chatton's view, there is no difference in God between "Socrates is sitting" and "Socrates is standing". In this sense Chatton says that God cognizes only the truth of the proposition, or He cognizes it always only in its true sense. Therefore there is not any change in God, because He always sees the truth.


Full Text.

Walter Chatton - Reportatio in Primum Sententiarum, dist. 38 (full text)

Distinctio 38
Quaestio unica
Utrum cum contingentia futurorum stet quod Deus sciat futura contingentia

Utrum cum contingentia futurorum stet quod Deus sciat futura contingentia.
Quod non, arguitur sic: omne scitum a Deo de necessitate est verum: Antichristum fore est scitum a Deo; igitur de necessitate est verum. Conclusio non stat cum contingentia futurorum, igitur nec veritas praemissarum.
Item, et in isto stat difficultas quaestionis, sequitur “Deus scivit Antichristum fore, igitur Antichristus erit’. Antecedens est necessarium et consequentia necessaria, igitur consequens necessarium. Consequens non stat cum contingentia, igitur. Quod onsequentia sit necessaria, patet ex opposito consequentis quod non stat cum antecedente. Antecedens patet esse necessarium, quia omne verum de praeterito est necessarium. Vel potest istud fieri in alia forma: “Deus scivit a fore, igitur a necessario erit”.
Contra: quod contingentia sit in rebus, quia quilibet experitur ir habere in potestate continente actus suos. Et similiter, Deus scivit omnia; quod tenemus fide; igitur etc.

Art. 1 – De modo loquendi de scientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium

In ista quaestiones erun tres articoli. Primus erit de modo loquendi in hac materia. Unde primo est videndum an Deus habeat determinatam scientiam futurorum contingentium, et quomodo hoc possi exprimi melius. Conclusio certa est quod sic, cuilibet fideli. Sed in modo ponendi est variatio, et vix aliquid est clarius.

Opinio aliorum
Unus modus ponit sic: quod Aristoteles haberet dicere quod neutra pars contradictoriorum contingentium est vera, puta “Sortes sedebit”, “Sortes non sedebit”, quia utrumque est aequaliter in libera protestate Sortis, igitur non plue est unum verum quam reliquum. Vel sic : neutrum est altero verius, igitur vel utrumque est verum vel neutrum.
Secundo dicunt: secundum veritate fidei, oportet tenere contrariu, quare etc.
Terbio dicunt quod licet divina scientia sit necessaria, est tamen contingenter scientia contingentium.

Contra hanc opinionem
Contra primum: dictum Aristotelis non est nec debet esse auctoritatum nisi quia evidens. Quid igitur vocat Aristoteles propositionem non esse determinate veram? Vel quod nihil sit in rerum natura, quo posito haec propositio de futuro est determinate vera, et hoc est verum; vel quod aliqua propositio significat aliquid fore, quo posito in esse, verum esset tunc dicere quod sic est modo in re sictu propositio significavit fore, et sic non potest negare propositionem de futuro esse veram determinate, quin quando Sortes actu sedet, non potesi negari quin tun ita sit in re sicut significavit ista prius “Sortes sedebit”.
Item, quando secundo dicunt quod altera pars est determinate vera secundum fidem, contra: si ista sit determinate vera “Sortes sedebit cras”, igitur amodo non esset consulendum circa hoc; ex quo enim iam est vera, amodo non manet sub deliberatione, et sic peribit meritum et merces et sollicitudo.
Confirmo hoc per argumentum eorum de quibusdam responsionibus. Si valet ibi, et hic. Deus non potest facere de praeterito ipsum non fuisse praeteritum, igitur si haec fuit vera in praeterito “Sortes sedebit”, Deus non poterit facere quin vera fuerit, et ita necessario sedebit, quod falsum est.
Confirmo per argumentum eorum pro Aristotele. Voluntas Sortis aequaliter se habet ad sedere et non sedere in a, igitur vel utraque istarum est vera vel neutra “Sortes sedebit in a”, “Sortes non sedebit in a”, aeque valet contra eos.

Opinio Petri Aureoli
Alius modus dicendi directe innititur Aristoteli, et tenent quod nulla propositio de futuro est determinate vera in in contingentibus, tum per Aristotelem, tum quia si haec sit vera « Sortes sedebit », non est dare quando incepit esse vera, igitur ab aeterno fuit vera, igitur est necessaria; quia si non, sed posset esse falsa, aut igitur antequam sedebit, et hoc non, quia ante est vera etiam ab aeterno; nec simul nec post, planum est. Sustinent igitur iminin consequentiam “Sortes sedebit, igitur necessario sedebit”, sed negant antecedens. Similiter, cum dicitur “Deus scit a fore », falsum est, quia « a fore » non est verum. Imaginantur quod scientia et notitia Dei est talis qua nata est haberi postquam res est, non quasi expectans futuritionem rei, et ideo nec tribuit rei quod eveniat, nec propositioni quod sit vera, nec aufert contingentiam a rebus.
Et quonodo tunc est de prophetia? Dicunt quod aliud mignificamus et ahud intendimus significare. Significamus quasi scientia praeveniret, sed intendimus significare quasi res praeveniat notitiam. Et addunt, et bene, quod nullus est modus congruus exprimendi preaescientiam Dei.
Si ista conclusio esset licita, bene esset clarus modus quantum ad primum, quod propositio de futuro nulla est vera, nec scita a Deo esse vera.

Contra opinionem Aureoli
Sed contra istam: quod non sit vera conclusio, probo: primo per primam rationem contra praecedentem opinionem. Suppono quod propositionem esse veram est ita esse in re sicut propositio significat esse, si est de praesenti; vel ita fore sicut significat fore, si est de futuro. Quid igitur intelligis per istam propositionem esse veram ‘Sortes sedebit’? Aut quod sic sit modo in re sicut propositio significat, et hoc est illud quod exigit veritas proposizioni de presenti, non autem de futuro, et ita non est ad propositum. Vel quod aliqua res erit, qua posita in sua mensura, sic est sicut propositio de futuro significavit, et sic loquendo nec Aristoteles nec aliquis alius potest rationabiliter negare eam esse veram.
Confirmo, quia quando Deus causat assensum in mente prophetae de re quae erit, ille assensus est verus, aliter Deus non posset certificare prophetam de re futura. Et ille assensus significat idem cum propositione tali ‘haec res erit’; igitur si assensus est verus, propositio erit vera.
Praeterea, omne quod modo est, aliquando fuit tuturum ; non ab aeterno fuit; igitur haec prius fuit vera ‘hoc est futurum’.
Item, aliter viator non esset certus quod beatitudo pro meritis, nec poneret se cum effectu ad bene agendum, spes non est nisi certa exspectatio respectu futuri contingentis.
Item, Deus non causat in mente prophetae assensum, quo assentiat sic esse in re, sed sic esse venturum in re.
Item, contra aliud.Antichristus non est modo, et modo est scientia Dei respectu Antichtisti esse, igitur scientia praecedit esse eius, et non e contra.
Et praeter hoc etiam stat tota difficultas, quomodo Deus preaescit futura, et tamen stet contingentia respectu eorundem.

Tertia opinio
Tertia opinio, quae currebat in Villa, tempore quo audivimus in Villa philosophica rationabilior iam dicens quia quando accipis ‘Antichristus erit’ vel ‘Sortes sedebit in a’, ista potest vel asserere se esse veram, vel suam de messe fore veram. Primo modo, non est vera; secundo modo, est vel potest poni esse vera.
Si est vera in secundo intellectu, igitur si asserat se esse veram, illo modo vera est ut asserit se veram, quia ex opposito sequitur oppositum, si intelligatur illud dictum generaliter.

Responsio Chatton
Dico igitur aliter in parte, quia quod contingentia sit in rebus, quilibet experitur in actibus suis. Et tunc dico quod semper ante a potest indifferenter utrumque, ita sedere sicut non sedere et e contra, est in potestate Sortis. Unde de re non est hic difflcultas magna. Sed quis sit modus aptus loquendi, in hoc consistit difficultas. Et unus modus loquendi potest esse quod tetigi arguendo, nec credo quod possit esse clarior quan quaerere ab opponente quid intelligit per istam esse veram determinate ‘Sortes sedebit in a’. Aut quod aliqua res sit vel fiaerit, vel dictum vel scriptum vel cognitio, quo posito haec propositio sit modo vera, et ita sit modo sicut propositio significat, et hoc non est verum, sed ista solum est condicio propositionis de praesenti vel de praeterito; et nulla propositio de futuro est, sic loquendo, determinate vera. Vel aliter: utrum aliqua res erit in a, qua posita in a, tunc erit verum dicere “modo est sicut ante signiftcavit propositio de futuro”, et sic est propositio de futuro vera.
Et isto modo possunt omnia dicta salvari. Et qui vellet sic dicere, posset dicere iuxta tertiam opinionem quod istae sunt distinctae propositiones “haec est vera « Sortes sedebit »,” et “haec erit vera «Sortes sedet ».” Et de prima dicerem quod non, quia tunc, ex quo iam vera est, non esset necessarium consiliari nec negotiari circa hoc quod foret. Secundam concedo, ubi demonstratur propositio de praesenti “haec erit vera “Sortes sedet”.”
Alius modus ponendi, quia nihil volo asserere in quacumque materia periculosa, est iste et communior, et potesi esse magis clarus per istum modum iam dictum. Quaere quid intelligis per istam “Sortes sedebit”; vel quod hoc ita sit verum quod, sive velit sive nolit, ipse sedebit in a, et in isto sensu nego; vel quod deliberabit – et deliberato voluntarie – sedebit, et sic concedo.
Sed quomodo tunc est de scientia Dei respectu contingentium? Dico quod non intendo dicere quod complexum, immo res significata per complexum, est verum scire, bene tamen virtute rerum potest sciri quod complexum est verum.
Sed cum quaeris utrum Deus sciat futura contingentia, quid intelligis per istam “Deus scit a fore”? Aut quod scientia Dei est aliquid, quo posito a erit, ita quod si mutaretur ista “a erit”, a veritate in falsitatem mutaretur scientia Dei, et hoc nego. Aut tota ista “Deus scit a fore” aequivaleat isti copulativae “Deus scit hoc, et hoc erit”, istud concedo, ita quod scientia accipiatur pro cognizione. Tunc enim dicere quod Deus scit a fore aequivalet huic copulativae “Deus cognoscit a et a erit”, cuius prima pars est necessaria et secunda contingens, quia de hac “a erit” dictum est prius quoti est adhuc positum, sed aliquid ponetur, quo posito ita est haec modo significat.
Quomodo igitur stat contingentia cum scientia Dei? Certe sicut stant simul quod a erit, et tamen quod contingenter erit, non est sic vera quin semper, antequam ponatur, possit eius veritar impediri. De hoc patebit clarius solvendo argumenta. Vel secundum alium modum tactum, Deus scit a fore et te sessurum non quod sedebis – velis nolis – sed sic quod scit quod tu deliberabis et ages contingenter.

Art. 2 - Ad argumenta difficilia

Secundus articulus est solvere argumenta quae faciunt hic difficultatem.
Primum est: quomodo teneat consequentia in secundo argumento ad principale.
Secundum est: quomodo utraque pars contradictionis indifferenter et aequaliter est in potestate libera Sortis, et tamen una vera, et non alla.
Tertium est argumentum Petri: quando posset esse falsa, vel ante a, vel tunc, vel post?
Et praeter ista prius tacta, sunt alia. Primum: si haec est vera secundum dicta « Antichristus erit », ponamus. Aut igitur est necessario vera, aut contingenter, et tunc non oportet consulere etc.
Item, si est modo vera, et non modo noviter vera, igitur ab aeterno. Aut igitur necessario, et propositum, quod contingentia non stet etc. Aut contingenter, ita quod potest non fore illud. Ponatur in esse quod hoc non erit, sequitur “hoc non erit, igitur haec non fuit vera “hoc eri?”;” consequens impossibile, quia ex quo haec modo fuerit vera in praeterito ‘hoc erit’, et omne praeteritum verum est necessarium, igitur necesse est hanc fuisse veram, et ita ex minus impossibili sequeretur impossibilius. Et quod plus, cum verum est, necessarium est, dico ego ex contingenti, impossibile, quod non videtur verum.
Item, utrumque est aeque confingens, igitur neutrum est verius.
Item, quodlibet futurum est aliud ab Antichristo. Haec est necessaria vel impossibilis, igitur propositio sibi repugnans est necessaria vel impossibilis; sed haec « Antichristus erit » sibi repugnat; igitur. Assumptum probatur, quia vel Antichristus erit, et tunc prima est imipossibilis; vel non erit, et tunc est necessaria.
Item, non esse Antichristi est aliquid extra animam quod necessario corrumpemr, igitur Antichristus necessario erit.
Item, Antichristus modo aequaliter se habet ad essendum et non essendum, igitur non plus est unum verum quam reliquum.
Item, natura contingentis ad utrumlibet magis opponitur necessario quam contingens in maiori parte, sed hoc non si una pars contradictionis esset determinate vera, igitur.

Ad argumenta supra dicta
Ad primum. Quod ideo feci in praeterito quia sic est evidentior ratio, “Deus scivit a fore, igitur a necessario erit’, quaero ab opponente quid intelligit per antecedens? Si idem quod per hanc copulativam “Deus intelligit hoc, et hoc est verum” nego consequentiam, ubi additur “necessario” in consequente. Quare? Quia ista copulativa est contingens, non ratione primae partis, quae est “Desus cognoscit hoc », quia haec est necessaria, sive demonstratur possibile sive impossibile, sed ratione secundae partis, scilicet « hoc erit », quia res non est iam posita, propter quam positam ipsa sit vera sed est ponenda in a, et ante a semper remanet in potestate libera mea ne hoc ponatur in a, et ubi propositio non sit vera.
Dices: accepi istam de praetento “Deus scivit a fore in a” – Resolvo istam in covulativam. ubi prius. ‘Deus cognovit hoc, et haec pars est necessaria, et « hoc erit », et istud secundum est contingens; nec est de praeterito ista pars contingens, sed de futuro. Isto modo non possunt illi respondere de alia via, quae ponit quod scit quod deliberabis etc.; sed illi habent dicere quod sicut est in potestate tua ne hoc sit in a, ita est in potestate tua ne Deus ab aeterno sciverit a, et tunc cum arguitur quod omne verum de praeterito est necessarium, habent dicere quod verum est, ubi illud praeteritum non dependet a futuro, cuius oppositum est in propositio.
Utrum autem cognitio Dei sit assensus vel scientia, et non solum apprehensio, posset dici quod cognitio Dei non est assensus nisi re posita; et quando res est futura, potest dici quod cognitio non est scientia, sed ambobus positis, scilicet notitia Dei et lapide, contradictio est quin sciat lapidem esse.
Ad secundum dico quod pro toto tempore ante a, voluntas Sortis aequaliter se habet ad utrumque, et ideo ista ‘Sortes sedebit in a’ non est vera pro sedere vel non sedere ante a, sed pro sedere in a, non quod ante a aliquid ponatur propter quod positum ipsa sit vera, sed aliquid ponetur in a, quo posito in a ita est tunc, vel tunc erit, verum dicere modo “ita est sicut propositio de futuro significavit fore”.
Ad aliud, quando inciperet esse falsa, dico quod aliud est de veritate propositionis de praesenti et de futuro; nam haec est vera ‘Sortes sedet’, quia aliquae res sunt modo in actu, quibus positis ipsa est vera propter illas positas; et ideo de vero tali ventate non oportet sollicitari nec consiliari ut sit ita. Non sic de ventate propositionis de futuro.
Dices quod secundum Scotum, propositio non est contingenter vera nisi quando actu est vera. Dico quod “contingenter” uno modo opponitur illi cuius oppositum includit repugnantiam; et isto modo verum est quod tunc est contingenter vera quando actu est vera, quia nulla esset repugnantia quod hoc instans esset, et tamen quod propositio, quae de facto est vera, non esset vera; sed non est sic contingens quod oporteat amodo circa hoc consiliari et negotiari. Sed non est sic de contingenti ventate propositionis de futuro. Et ideo quando Aristoteles dicit quod propositio de futuro in contingentibus non est vera, verum est sic intelligendo, quod nihil est positum, quo posito propositio est vera, sed aliquid ponetur, quo posito ita erit tunc sicut propositio de futuro significavit. Sed cum hoc stat quod Sortes potest non stare in a, quia semper ante a est in potestate Sortis facere proposidonem non esse veram.
Ad aliud dico quod contingenter est vera, quia suo modo est vera pro re ponenda, ante cuius positionem semper potest imperidiri.
Dices, si est vera, non oportet consiliari. Dico quod sic, quia semper antequam ponatur in esse, potest impediri et promoveri.
Ad aliud, concedo quod quandocumque ab aeterno formaliter erat vera, quia quando res illa ponetur in a, ita est tunc sicut propositio de futuro ab aeterno significavit. Et concedo quod ex minus inconvenienti sequitur magis inconveniens, arguendo negative a posteriori ad negationem prioris.
Et cum dicis, haec fuit vera de praeterito “Sortes sedebii”, quali ventate? Nunquam certe tali quali haec “Sortes sedet”; immo veritas illius dependebat a futuro, et ideo antequam ponatur, et Deus et creatura potest facere oppositum. Aliam veritatem non dabo tibi.
Ad sextum dictum est.
Ad aliud dico quod eo modo quo convenit veritas propositioni de futuro, illud assumptum est contingens. Et hoc similiter “aliquod futurum erit vel est idem Antichristo ». Et cum probas quod non, quia quodibet vel est Antichristus vel non, et hoc necessario, dico: quia utrumque istorum est contingens « quodlibet futurum erit aliud ab Antichristo” et “aliquod futurum erit idem Antichristo ».
Ad aliud dixi alias de negationibus, quod significant idem quod affirmationes oppositae. Aliqui autem dicunt quod sunt determinationes compositionis. Sed si “non esse” idem significat quod “esse”, tunc nihil ad propositum. Sed ponamus quod ista res, ista forma, quae non stat cum forma Antichristi in materia, necessario corrumpetur, “igitur Antichristus necessario erit”; non sequitur.
Ad aliud, iam patuit.
Ad decimum, nego minorem, quia contingens natum potest semper usque ad a indifferenter poni vel non poni in a a creatura, sicut potest contingens ad utrumibet.

Articulus 3 – Utrum cum contingentia futurorum stet scientia certa Dei respectu eorum

Tertius articulus est respondere ad formam quaestionis, utrum cum contingentia futurorum stet scientia certa Dei respectu eorum.

Ad quaestionem
Et dico quod sic, sicut habent tenere. Sed quomodo hoc debeat poni, patet discorrendo secundum diversas opiniones tactas, scilicet quia videt quomodo deliberabis etc., tunc Deus novit quod hoc erit medinate contingentia in causa respectu effectus sui. Sed secundum alium modum dicendi, quia cum tali veritate propositionis quae est, non est per positionem alicuius rei de facto, sed per hoc quod aliquid ponetur, quo posito verum est dicere tunc quod moto ita est sicut propositio de futuro significavit, tunc Deum scire tale fore stat cum contingentia illius, quia aequivalet copulative, cuius secunda pars est contingens.

Aliqua dubia
Sed tunc remanent contra hoc aliqua dubia. Primum, pro quo instanti potest Deus velle a non fore? Et Doctor Scotus tenet quod pro eodem pro quo vult a fore. Sed contra hoc arguitur quod Deus non habet potentiam ad opposita obiecta pro simul igitur non potest pro eodem instanti pro quo aget a, vel vult a fore, velle oppositum.
Item, non potest facere de praeterito non praeteritum, igitur si voluit a fore, non potest facere quin voluerit a fore, et ita non poterit velle a non fore.
Item, voluntas Dei est sic determinata respectu a fore, quod impossibile est quin fuerit determinata, igitur a erit necessario, nec potest non velle a fore.
Item, aut ad volitionem Dei qua determinavit a fore sequitur effectus, aut non. Si sic, necessario. Si non, propter hoc non scit a fore.

Responsio Chatton
Responsio. Non video quin, ubi veritas propositionis dependet a futuro et ipsam esse veram est rem esse ponendam in tali futuro, quin semper antequam in filo futuro res huiusmodi ponatur, possit propositio illa esse falsa. Nec ipsi etiam possunt hoc vitare, quin scilicet pro eadem mensura pro qua propositio contingenter est vera, posset esse falsa; quia dicunt quod Deus aeternaliter scivit a fore, et quod eternaliter fuit haec vera et contingenter vera, igitur simul est vera et confingenter vera.
Item, sustinent quod Deus potuit produxisse mundum ab aeterno, et tamen tunc Deus non necessario produxisset mundum ab aeterno, igitur stat quod propositio in illa mensura in qua est vera, sit contingenter vera et possit esse falsa. Unde haec est aeternaliter vera “Deus voluit a fore”, et tamen omnes habent respondere hic quod voluit contingenter a fore.

Responsio ad dubia supra dicta
Ad primum igitur argumentum. Quid sit Deum velle, alias. In communi autem usu accipitur pro “Deum agere” et “Deum contingenter velle aliquid” est Deum contingenter agere vel esse contingenter acturum illud.
Quando igitur quaeris « pro quo instanti est contingentia?”, aut vis tu loqui de instanti in quo ponitur res, pro qua propositio verificata est de futuro, et tunc non remanet realis potentia ad oppositum. Si loquaris de alio instanti, dico quod in quolibet ante illud in quo ponitur talis res, potuit esse falsa. Homo imaginatur veritatem propositionis de futuro sicut de praesenti, ac si esset aliquid positum propter cuius positionem ipsa esset vera, et non sic est, sed aliquid est ponendum, quo posito ita est sicut propositio significavit. Non est igitur potentia ad ponendum opposita in a, sed semper ante a est potentia ad ponendum a vel non ponendum indifferenter.
Ad secundum, quilibet habet respondere. Quid igitur intelligis per ‘Deum velle a fore?’ Si quod Deus producturus vel creaturus a, concedo quod haec verificatur pro aliquo ponendo in aliquo frituro, puta in a.
Ad aliud ‘quae est illa determinatio?’ – Dico quod non est aliud nisi quod Deus de futuro producet a.
Ad aliud. Si sic intelligas quod quando Deus agit a, a necessario agitur, bene quidem; aliud non dico.

Ad argumenta principalia
Ad primum argtimentum principale. Maior est falsa, intelligendo per “omne scitum a Deo vel cognitum a Deo” quod cognitum erit.
Ad secundum dictum est prius.


Ocham said...

Welcome to the internet. I have a similar goal (i.e. bringing medieval Latin and Latin translations to the net) at my site the Logic Museum (Google 'Logic Museum' to find it.

But a question: is this material already digitally available elsewhere on the net. Or is it 'virgin'? If the latter, I take my hat off to you. You are performing a valuable service.

Doctorsubtilis said...

Dear Ocham,
Texts are "virgin" in the sense that they were not on the web and they appear here for the first time.
If you look at the first post (http://doctorsubtilis.blogspot.com/2008/11/1st-post.html), you can see the list of my library.
Well, I'm copying all these books in a word format and I will publish them partly on the website I'm making, partly on my blog.
But, if you desire something in particular, I try to send it to you soon. This holds also for friends: if some friends are interested in something, tell me. My purpose is to spread.

P.S.: your website is an inspiration...

Ocham said...

This is a great venture. I think a website is better than a blog. I have a wiki at your disposal if you are interested in wikis. That way you have an audit trail of changes to your text, you can discuss changes with others on a talk page, and you can link to other projects on the wiki (a bit like Wikipedia, but it is closed, you own the content, and membership is controlled.

And it's free!

Let me know if you are interested.

Doctorsubtilis said...

Of course I'm interested. If I send you the texts, we can publish them???
In this case we can publish them step by step...
Tell me when you are ready, because I have already some texts, I would like to publish...
Ad majora.

My mail: stefano.menegatti@gmail.com